| In December 2009, Solyndra filed for an IPO. A few months later, the company updated its paperwork with the SEC to note that its auditor had raised doubts about its ability to continue operations. "Here's a company that's trying to sell itself to private investors when its losses are mounting," Chernova said. "This is not good for an IPO candidate to have this statement in their filings." Solyndra pulled the offering in June 2010. The company didn't make the Journal's 2011 list of the top venture-backed clean-tech companies. At the Journal's ECO:nomics conference in early 2011, Brian Harrison, Gronet's replacement as CEO, blamed Solyndra's struggles on unrealistic growth expectations and too little focus on sales and marketing. Another factor was the unusual design of the company's product. By 2009, polysilicon prices had dropped 80%, giving an advantage to conventional solar panels that used the material. It cost Solyndra $4 to produce its tubes for every watt of power output—and the company could sell them for only $3.24 per watt. Rival First Solar, which used a different material called cadmium telluride in its panels, had costs of 93 cents per watt in 2009. Investors with knowledge of Solyndra's operations told Chernova in 2011 that the DOE loan guarantee may have hurt more than it helped. The money went toward constructing a new factory, burdening the already struggling company with significant fixed costs. As Solyndra's fortunes turned, the government's provision that it be paid out first in the event of a failure made it harder to raise additional capital from private investors. Competition with state-subsidized Chinese solar panels also squeezed Solyndra and other manufacturers. | 
